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ABSTRACT 
Catherine Claire Hausman: Iran Hostage Crisis: A Media Narrative 
(Under the direction of Vivian Ibrahim) 
 
 
The Iran Hostage Crisis, from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981, was a defining 
moment in American foreign policy and US – Iranian relations. The news media – local and 
national newspapers and television – was saturated with coverage of the situation in Tehran and 
the subsequent US reaction. Americans watched the news over the 444 days, feeling sympathy 
and forging a collective national bond with the hostages; the international conflict was deeply 
personal for many Americans. The media played a central role in the establishment of the 
narrative of the hostage crisis, developing specific roles and personas of the United States and 
Iran as the crisis continued. In this thesis, I will explore the historical foundations of the newly 
established Islamic Republic of Iran and its revolutionary spirit which overflowed, resulting in 
the embassy’s seizure, as well as the tumultuous relationship between Iran and the US and the 
greater atmosphere of the 1970s. I analyze two events that book end the hostage crisis. I examine 
the creation of the media’s narrative surrounding the hostage crisis and the historical role these 
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 The Iran Hostage Crisis, from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981, was a defining 
moment in American foreign policy and US – Iranian relations. The news media – local and 
national newspapers and television – was saturated with coverage of the situation in Tehran and 
the subsequent US reaction. Americans watched the news over the 444 days, feeling sympathy 
and forging a collective national bond with the hostages; the international conflict was deeply 
personal for many Americans. The media played a central role in the establishment of the 
narrative of the hostage crisis, developing specific roles and personas of the United States and 
Iran as the crisis continued. In this thesis, I explore the historical foundations of the newly 
established Islamic Republic of Iran and its revolutionary spirit which overflowed, resulting in 
the embassy’s seizure, as well as the tumultuous relationship between Iran and the US and the 
greater atmosphere of the 1970s. Using Ernest Bormann’s fantasy-theme method of rhetorical 
criticism, I analyze two events that book end the hostage crisis. These case studies allow for an 
in-depth examination of the creation of the media’s narrative surrounding the hostage crisis and 
the historical role these outlets played in shaping the experience of American news consumers.  
 
Historical Problem and Sources used:  
 Until the hostage crisis began, relations between the United States and Iran were 
relatively unassuming. As with many other countries with which the United States had 
diplomatic relations in the 20th century, they traded weapons, raw materials and manufactured 
goods, and the United States invested in the Iranian economy1. These relations deterred the 
notion that this bond would shatter and they would later become verbally and physically hostile 
 
1 Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran, Chapter 2: 1953, (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), 26. 
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towards one another. Suddenly seizing their Embassy and its diplomatic workers, Iran became a 
capable aggressor in the eyes of Americans. Seeing the swift takeover of the embassy in Tehran 
and learning of the Iranian government’s celebration of this deed, Americans’ disillusionment to 
the threat of Iran was shattered. The Iran Hostage Crisis is perceived as a unique international 
incident. Historic analysis tends to view this crisis as one which was a culmination of Iranian 
anti-Americanism in the wake of its revolution and not a part of the larger relationship between 
the United States and Iran. These 444 days also are perceived as being removed from the 
domestic political spheres of both states. In this thesis, I explore the ways in which this crisis was 
a less surprising turn of events in US-Iranian relations and its broad impact in the United States 
domestic events throughout the 444 days.  
 The US media played a vital role in the way in which events in Tehran were reported. 
Since these events were occurring on the other hemisphere, the only personal experience an 
American was able to have with the crisis was through the news media. I argue that the 
American news media controlled the first substantive encounter between the average American 
and Iran. As such, I argue that the US media played a pivotal role in the narrative which grew out 
of the Iran Hostage Crisis. The media controlled many of the avenues by which Americans could 
gain historical background of US- Iranian relations before the crisis. Additionally, the United 
States media offered its own lenses through which Americans perceived the actions of the 
Iranian students and the state’s leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. I will analyze the ways in which the 
news media created a narrative which juxtaposed the United States and Iran, allowing further 
assumptions to be drawn about the revolutionary Iranian state and the victimized United States. 
Through photographs, language, and video, journalists covering the hostage crisis were able to 
guide Americans toward these perceptions.  
 6 
 I aim to understand the media’s formulation and narration of the crisis to the American 
population through an examination of nightly news broadcasts and newspapers from the crisis. 
While the Iran Hostage Crisis has been discussed extensively by David Farber and a media 
analysis of the crisis has been completed by R.E. Dowling, they fail to take into account the 
significance of the first and final days of the hostage crisis. As these days “book end” the event, 
holding the first and final moments of the crisis, they are crucial to analyze as they illuminate the 
foundation of the crisis narrative and its closing scenes. Primary news media from November 4 
and 5, 1979 and January 19 and 20, 1981 will demonstrate the strategies by which these 
journalists began and concluded this narrative. Journalists’ implications on these days are 
especially significant as they have ramifications on perceptions of US-Iranian relations 
throughout the hostage crisis and after it has concluded. This analysis will offer a more in depth 
view of the media’s role within the crisis than that of Farber, who is more concerned by the step 
by step actions which resulted in the seizure. While Dowling follows the same media analysis, 
applying it to the hostage crisis, he does so broadly, covering the entirety of the 444 days. This 
work fails to consider the ways in which the crisis narrative is formulated, the early and late 
choices which define the crisis. The New York Times and the Chicago Tribune, as well as CBS 
News offer ample source material for my analysis. Moreover, in order to understand the 
implications and role played by the US in the lead up to the hostage crisis, I analyze primary 
reports of American State Department officials. Through the Office of the Historian of the State 
Department, previously classified documents such as “Daily Situation Reports” and climate 
assessments may guide my research. Additionally, in 2014, The National Security Agency 
released an unredacted version of The Battle For Iran, which included the detailed the coup 
executed by American and British agents in Iran in 1953. This extensive resource outlines the 
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motives which guided the United States and Great Britain to act and describes sentiment of 
Iranian citizens throughout the operation. These accounts will offer a closer look to the coup and 
the relationships between the Shah, the CIA, and British Secret Intelligence which later became a 
root of Iranian anti-Americanism. In contrast to Farber, I use this historical background and 
classified sources to gain specific details from the primary actors in the events as they unfolded 
in 1953. My thesis examines the American political landscape, its leaders’ motives throughout 
the hostage crisis, and domestic ramifications. I use the memoir of Jimmy Carter (Keeping Faith: 
Memoirs of a President) to offer a primary perspective of the President during the crisis. Finally, 
I use Ernest Bormann’s fantasy theme method of rhetorical criticism in my analysis of American 
news media. Using The New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and CBS News from November 4 
and 5, 1979 and January 19 and 20, 1981, I will examine the methods by which a collective 
narrative is established by the media. The ways in which the central actors are described, the 
locations of events, and the actions reported upon by the media are crucial to the formulation and 
assessment of the crisis narrative.  
 
Before the media analysis, I examine the foundations of the state of Iranian-US relations in the 





SECTION 1: BACKGROUND 
1.1 The 1953 Coup 
The strategic location of Iran meant that it had been under quasi British rule since the end 
of World War II. As foreign relations between the Soviet Union and other Allied powers 
continued to strain, many of these Allied leaders identified Iran as a potential place of communist 
infiltration. Reza Shah of the Pahlavi family had been the leader of the Iranian people from the 
beginning of the 1920s. He implemented many changes which created a modern and united 
Iranian state, bringing together the culturally diverse groups within the country. His power came 
to an early end in 1941 when he was forced to abdicate his throne due to British and Soviet 
pressures2. Reza Shah had openly voiced his support for the Nazi regime, hoping to throw off 
British and Soviet control. Throughout the Shah’s reign, Iran had been fluctuating between the 
pervasive influences of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, both aiming to use its natural 
resources and influence its political system for their own benefit. Hoping that the early battle 
successes of the Nazi regime during WWII could bring about a new world balance that would 
free itself from imperial control, Iran allied with the Axis powers3. As Iran sat in a significant 
geographic location during the war, touching the Soviet Union from both the east and west, as 
well as having access to oil and the Persian Gulf, the Allied powers were quite concerned 
regarding Iran’s alliance. The Allies quickly put an end to this potential Axis power, invading 
 
2 Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran, Chapter 2: 1953, (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), 22. 
3 Nikolay A, Kozhanov, "The Pretexts and Reasons for the Allied Invasion of Iran in 1941," Iranian Studies 45, no. 4 (n.p. 
Iranian Studies, 2012): 479-97. 
 
and occupying it. As the war concluded, the big three allied powers, Franklin Roosevelt of the 
United States, Winston Churchill of Great Britain, and Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, began 
to debate whether to return Iran to pseudo British and Soviet control or to offer the state self-
determination4.  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt demanded that both the Soviets and British leave Iran and 
allow them to establish their own government during  negotiations in Tehran in 1943. The 
Declaration of the Allied Leaders on Iran assured the independence of Iran, reading the allied 
powers were all “at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran” 5. Thus, Reza Shah’s son, 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, became the leader of Iran at the young age of 216. The actions of the 
United States in defense of Iranian sovereignty allowed a relatively strong relationship to be 
formed between the two countries. The United States agreed to allow Iran to purchase military 
weaponry, hoping to stave off interference from the Soviets. Additionally, Iran received financial 
assistance from the United States in the years after becoming independent. For instance, in 1952, 
$23,450,000 was allocated for developmental assistance for Iran by President Truman7. As Cold 
War fears were leading much of American political decision-making, the United States was 
willing to appease this young leader’s desire to be a great military head of state8. The Shah’s 
prioritization of military might over the well-being of his citizens was examined with larger 
scrutiny by Iranians as other political alternatives began to call for change.  
 
4 A.H. Hamzavi, “Iran and the Tehran Conference,” International Affairs 20 no. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
April 1944), 199. 
5 Ibid, 199.  
6 Ray Takeyh, "Iran under Occupation," In The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty, (London: 
Yale University Press, 2021) 15. 
7 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 26. 
8 Ibid, 29. 
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As technology innovated during the second world war entered the domestic marketplace, 
oil became an essential good; its worth rapidly increased as it fueled the cars and planes which 
were now used by citizens and militaries alike. In the early 20th century, when Great Britain had 
played a more prominent role within Iran, the British put up capital to establish the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. In 1908, they founded this business which would create vast wealth and it, 
alongside the British Imperial Bank of Persia, established Great Britain as the main western 
influence in Iran9. While this agreement offered the Iranian people a large pay day up front, this 
deal later soured in the eyes of the Iranians, as they saw much of the profit from this commodity, 
originating from their country, leave in the hands of foreigners. As many Iranians sought to 
resolve the economic struggles by managing their own people, government, and economy, these 
previous negotiations became unpopular10. At the start of 1950, a group of Iranian nationalists 
began to advocate for a renegotiation of the oil deal with the British. This group saw the oil deal 
as unacceptable and a demonstration of the West’s continued presence in Iranian affairs. 
Additionally, the late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by multiple impoverished, but oil rich 
countries renegotiating their oil agreements with the West. Many of these countries would go on 
to be founding members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
September 1960.11 Venezuela, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia all were able to achieve a 50-50 split of 
oil proceeds and begin to take back their own natural resource-driven economies. This 
galvanized Iranian confidence in forcing the British to renegotiate12. 
 
9 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 25. 
10 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 26. 
11 “Member Countries,” Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, accessed March 12, 2021, 
https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm 
12 Herbert E. Hansen, “Some Comments on Nationalization of Oil by OPEC Members,” Journal of Energy and 
Development 1, vo. 2 (n.p. International Research Center for Energy and Development, 1976), 262. 
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The public sentiment within Iran had rapidly become more nationalistic, with many 
beginning to denounce any compromise with the British. Ali M. Ansari, an Associate fellow in 
the Middle East at Chatham House, reflects in his book Confronting Iran upon the radically 
shifting public opinion within Iran in the years leading up to the coup, writing, the “renewed 
synthesis between Shia Islam and Iranian identity and the exploitation of religious nationalism 
was highly effective in mobilizing the urban masses. It also ensured a radicalization of opinion 
into non-negotiable absolutes” 13. Many Iranians were influenced by the ulema, the Iranian 
religious elite, who spoke out against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as one of the last vestiges 
of British control of Iran. Muhammad Mossadegh, who would become the face of the movement 
to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was born to a wealthy, landowning family and 
was educated in Europe, earning a doctorate in law, before returning to Iran. He became well 
known in Iranian politics after being jailed by the current Shah’s father for demanding a more 
open government. After forming the National Front, a coalition of people in support of the 
middle class who shared opposition to royal authority and foreign influence, Mossadegh began to 
advocate for no compromises regarding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company14. This line of argument 
grew very popular with the Iranian general public and nationalization became an immovable 
force.15 The United States State Department commented with increasing concern regarding this 
change in political demands, writing a memorandum to the Policy Planning Staff, 
“Nationalization has gone so far in the minds of the Iranians that there is no prospect whatever of 
a ‘negotiated’ settlement. Feeling is running so high that the best that might be salvaged from the 
 
13 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 29. 
14 W. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, Chapter 14 – Democracy and Authoritarianism, (n.p. 
Routledge, May 2018), 290. 
15 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 29. 
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present situation is an operating contract for the British, although even this is only a 
possibility”16. The Prime Minister spoke out against Mossadegh’s radical demand to throw out 
the British and four days later he was assassinated17. This violent act was a proclamation in favor 
of Mossadegh’s platform and encouraged the Majlis (Parliament) to vote to nationalize the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. As the man who had spearheaded this movement, Mossadegh was 
named the new Prime Minister of Iran April 28, 195118. The fearful Shah agreed to these 
decisions, concerned that this group’s nationalistic behavior could be turned against him as 
well19.  
As Prime Minister Mossadegh attempted to maintain his power within Iran against 
numerous internal adversarial groups, he pivoted around the political spectrum, avoiding any true 
partisan stance. Mossadegh’s relations with other countries were no different than his internal 
political evasion. The United States and Great Britain halted all imports of Iranian oil, attempting 
to force Mossadegh to speak with them regarding Iran’s political future, however, he dodged 
these inquiries. As he had laid witness to the tumultuous political atmosphere within Iran, with 
the last two prime ministers, Razmara and Ala’, being assassinated and replaced after 46 days 
respectively, Mossadegh was weary of his opposition20. If he was perceived to be negotiating 
with the western states which he vehemently rejected in order to get into power, his opposition 
 
16 Memorandum From Henry Villard of the Policy Planning Staff to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff 
(Nitze) Department of State, Iran 1951-1954, May 24, 1951, accessed January 12, 2021, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d29. 
17 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 29. 
18 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 30. 
19 Progress Report Prepared for the National Security Council, State Department, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Iran 1951-1954, May 31, 1951. Accessed January 13, 2021, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d31 
20 Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central 
Intelligence Agency, Iran 1951 – 1954, April 30, 1951, accessed January 23, 2021, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d19 
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could potentially end his political career and his life. Instead, Mossadegh continued his 
nationalistic and vague rhetoric, gaining support of the Tudeh Party within Iran. This communist 
faction was well known within the United States as a Cold War concern21. As Ali M. Ansari 
points out, the relationship between Iran and the United States, especially American paranoia, 
“had a certain circularity. Western anxiety increased pressure on Mossadegh, who in turn was 
forced to take on more drastic autocratic powers and become increasingly dependent on the Left, 
particularly the Tudeh Party” 22. The Prime Minister’s association with this group further 
condemned him in the eyes of the United States government.  
Even after the radical action taken by Iranian leadership to appease supporters of the 
National Front, namely the election of Mossadegh as Prime Minster and the move to nationalize 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the revolutionary spirit was still present in Iran. Iranians 
continued to protest and demand change, although their political goals were not clear. In fact, the 
United States felt that Iran was not taking enough action to quell the more radical parts of the 
political upheaval. In a progress report offered to the National Security Council, the State 
Department reflected, “The present Iranian Government not only has done nothing to restore 
calm but has shown every indication of desiring to keep the Iranian people at a high emotional 
pitch” 23. The public sentiment which had brought about this new wave of policy in Iran and 
established Mossadegh as Prime Minister was still present and being fostered by the Iranian 
government. The revolutionary zeal of the people was still guiding much action by the Iranian 
 
21 David Patrick Houghton, “Explaining the Origins of the Iran Hostage Crisis: A Cognitive Perspective” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 18, no. 2, (2006), 267. 
22 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 35. 
23 Progress Report Prepared for the National Security Council, State Department, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Iran 1951-1954, May 31, 1951, accessed December 10, 2020, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d31 
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government and causing widespread protests. The United States recognized an opportunity to 
capitalize upon the “high emotional pitch” of the Iranian people.  In October of 1952, discussions 
began to plot to remove this Iranian leader and replace him with an individual who would be 
more favorable to the United States24. Edward Said, a well reputed literary scholar who 
formulated the critical concept of orientalism, reflected on a coup which happened more than 
thirty years later, but which followed the same goals as Eisenhower’s original. Said asserted that 
the Iran Contra Affair, like the coup of 1953, was “nothing less than an attempted coup whose 
goals were either the fomenting of prolonged instability in Iran or the accession to power of 
some person or group less hostile to the U.S. and Israel” 25. 
Under President Eisenhower, the United States foreign policy began to change. In the 
midst of the Cold War, Eisenhower sought to maintain American superiority against the Soviets, 
while also being as economical and subvert as possible. Putting greater emphasis on the CIA and 
foreign operatives, Eisenhower was able to side step congressional approval for his military 
actions and maintain plausible deniability26. In the days before the coup, the British and the 
Americans worked together to create the appearance of a popular movement against Mossadegh 
and in favor of the Shah. Hiring rough and tumble individuals to begin rioting in streets, paying 
of Iranian military leadership who were at odds with the prime minister, and opening discussions 
of a coup with the Shah, the CIA began plans for Operation Ajax27.  
 
24 1953 Iran Coup : New U.S. Documents Confirm British approached U.S. in Late 1952 About Ousting Mossadeq, 
National Security Archive, August 8, 2017, accessed December 11, 2020, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-
book/iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late.  
25 Edward W. Said, “Irangate: A Many-Sided Crisis,” Journal of Palestine Studies 16, no. 4 (Berkley: Institute for 
Palestine Studies), 28. 
26 Ervand Abrahamian, “The 1953 Coup in Iran,” Science & Society 65, no. 2 (n.p. Guilford Press, 2001), 197.  
27 David Farber, Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 56. 
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The operation’s leader, Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of President Franklin Roosevelt, 
subtly began to accrue a mob to pour into the streets in favor of the removal of Mossadegh. With 
only $100,000 in cash, he was able to pull together a spark which would ignite a call to throw out 
the current leadership. There were concerns whether the operation would succeed, with a few 
individual arrested in the days leading up to the event. Rumors of American involvement in a 
coup attempt then began to sweep Iran, causing some outbursts in the streets demanding the 
Americans not interfere. The Shah fled Iran for Italy, concerned it would turn violent. He was 
only calmed upon hearing word from “the American,” Kermit Roosevelt28. After the pro-Shah 
military restored peace to the streets, Roosevelt’s mob came out from behind the scenes and 
began to destroy pro-Mossadegh newspapers and seek out and punish communist Tudeh Party 
members29. Tens of thousands of Iranian citizens also took to the streets and began to advocate 
for change with Roosevelt’s forces, frustrated with the current leadership. Mossadegh quickly 
fled Tehran and the Shah returned from Italy to lead the Iranian people30. 
Eisenhower was pleased with the success of the clandestine operation led by Roosevelt. 
While there were some concerns early on in the planning process, the execution and success of 
the mission allowed for greater control of Iran by the United States. Eisenhower wrote of the 
mission in his Diary on Iran, released by the NSA some 50 plus years after the mission took 
place:  
Another recent development that we helped bring about was the restoration of the Shah to 
power in Iran and the elimination of Mossadegh. The things we did were “covert.” If 
knowledge of them became public, we would not be embarrassed in that region, but our 
 
28 Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, August 17, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Iran 1951-1954, accessed December 10, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-
54Iran/d271 
29 Moyara De Moraes Ruehsen, "Operation 'Ajax' Revisited: Iran, 1953," Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (n.p. Taylor & 
Francis, 1993), 480. 
30 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 36. 
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chances do anything of like nature in the future would almost totally disappear. 
Nevertheless our agent there, a member of the CIA, worked intelligently, courageously 
and tirelessly31. 
 
Eisenhower’s concern regarding maintaining Operation Ajax as covert highlights a consistent 
aim throughout his presidency. Eisenhower’s military experience as a general and leader of the 
Allied forces in European theater influenced his style of foreign diplomacy. He firmly believed 
that subvert missions to actively influence the political structures of other countries behind the 
scenes would allow for greater success in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. This strategy 
of denial and silence continued both before and after the coup took place. U.S. Ambassador Loy 
Henderson wrote to the State Department in the days after the coup was proved successful and 
encouraged no comment by the United States in regards to the coup, even denying it played a 
part of the events. He wrote, “Zahedi’s Government like all governments of Iran eventually will 
become unpopular and at that time US might be blamed for its existence” 32. Zahedi was the 
newly appointed prime minister of Iran after the fall of Mossadegh. In time Henderson was 
proved right, although silence did little to convince the Iranians of America’s lack of 
involvement. While the mission to reestablish the Shah’s leadership was a success and there 
were no official discoveries of the participation of the United States in a coup attempt, the 
Iranian people believed they knew what had happened behind closed doors. The CIA’s 
participation in the coup and the common knowledge of this incident within the Iranian general 
public deeply impacted Iranians’ perspective upon the United States.33 This decision by the 
 
31 Eisenhower Diary Covering Iran 10/8/1953, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran 
1951-1954, accessed December 8, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d328. 
32 No.351 The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to Department, August 21, 1953, Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Iran 1951-1954, accessed December 5, 2020, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d351. 
33 Houghton, “Explaining the Origins of the Iran Hostage Crisis,”  270-271.  
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United States would become a spot of contention between the American government and the 
general public of Iran in the years to come. 
 
1.2 From White Revolution to Iranian Revolution 
 After Muhammad Reza Shah returned to power, he significantly limited the political 
rights of his people. He ensured he would not lose power again by being hyper-attentive to the 
dissenting groups within the country and their followers. He instituted SAVAK, a covert 
military-style police force which punished those who openly disavowed the Shah. This group 
became infamous for its brutal human rights abuses against Iranian citizens34. The enforcement 
of the Shah’s power bred fear amongst the Iranian people, encouraging the majority of the 
population to bear their hardships in silence and hold in their disdain for the Shah’s brutality and 
political choices35. Additionally, Muhammad Reza Shah instituted a group of policies including 
land reform and cultural changes which would allow Iran to modernize, hoping to foster a sense 
of indebtedness in Iranians. The group of policy decisions put forth by Reza Shah to institute 
these changes was referred to as the “White Revolution,” as it was essentially bloodless36. The 
United States fully supported this plan of action, recognizing it as a necessary step to move Iran 
into the 20th century. In the 1970s, there was a Mandatory Declassification Review request made 
regarding the United States role in Iran. The document composed was entitled The Battle for 
Iran, detailing the atmosphere in Iran prior to the coup attempt in 1953 as well as details of the 
 
34 Farber, Taken Hostage, 60. 
35 Desmond Harney, The Priest and the King: An Eye Witness Account of the Iranian Revolution, (London: I.B. 
Tauris Publishers, 1998), 29. 
36 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 249. 
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coup. The United States praised Iran for its realization that military might alone cannot breed 
success and support of a state’s people. 
A powerful army, a modern air force, and a well-equipped navy cannot be built in a 
vacuum. Changes in the country’s social and economic structure to improve national 
health and educational levels were necessary to provide adequate manpower for these 
forces[…] The success of the White Revolution—that is, reform and change directed 
from the top—has solidified the foundations of the throne that seemed so shaky and 
insecure in the violent days of 1952 and 195337. 
 
This White Revolution offered new opportunities to Iranian citizens in the realms of education, 
gender equality, and land reform. However, the political motives of the White Revolution also to 
fruition, as the Shah worked to undermine the middle class and establish support in the peasant, 
landless class38. These changes broke with traditional Iranian societal expectations tied to Islam, 
leaving many of the religious elite within Iran feeling as though their power had been limited. 
This “revolution” was not as smoothly implemented as the Shah originally hoped, with 
conservative agitation taking place in city streets39. White Revolution policies were now 
replacing the solutions given by the religious elite. This left the religious leadership angry, as the 
Shah’s political solutions conflicted with Islamic teaching, further demeaning their relevance. 
Despite these flagrant human rights violations, the United States maintained a strong 
relationship with Iran after the coup. The commitment demonstrated by American leadership to 
keep the Shah in power, while mostly led by Cold War fears, was still present, and as such, the 
United States maintained a strong trade relationship with Iran. As the American presidency 
continued to change hands, from Eisenhower, to Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford, the 
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relationship rarely faltered40. In The Battle for Iran, the US State Department reflected upon 
United States – Iran relations, as well as the Shah’s maintained power and military strategy. 
While by no means a dedicated western ally, Iran retains its fear of the Soviets, and the 
enormous wealth that it has gained from the increased value of oil… is still being used to 
build strong military forces not only for self-defense but to support Iranian aspirations for 
dominance in the Persian Gulf as well41.   
 
This mutually beneficial relationship, with the United States supplying Iran weapons and 
maintaining a foothold in the Middle East, allowed relations strengthen between the two. 
Occasional oil price hikes caused tension, but overwhelmingly America’s need for oil and an ally 
in the Middle East encouraged American officials to turn a blind eye to the Shah’s misdeeds.  
 The government structure was now fortified within Iran, with the Shah sitting at the top 
and hand selecting who sat beneath him. Popular sentiments which had forced him to surrender 
his power in the 1950s were monitored closely and consistent limitations on political rights 
caused citizens to remain silent. This non-democratic governmental form clashed with United 
States’ political values, but the United States was more interested in maintaining relations than 
encouraging real change in Iran. Commenting upon the reality of political life in Iran, the State 
Department wrote, “There is little question as to who is running Iran, of course; the Shah has a 
monopoly on political power, and although parliamentary elections and procedures may furnish 
the window dressing of democratic government, it is the Shah alone who determines national 
policy” 42. Surprisingly, even amidst the limited political climate within Iran, some individuals 
spoke up and were able to achieve some success in their criticism of the Shah and advocacy for 
different platforms. In 1961, the Freedom Movement Party was founded by Mehdi Bazaragan, 
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who would become the Prime Minister of Iran in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. His 
party advocated for the entrance of reformist Islam into the politics of the state43.  
This spurred later opposition groups in 1963, most prominently led by a religious leader, 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini had come under fire from the government in 1964 after speaking 
out against the policy of capitulations, particularly Iran’s willingness to house United States 
military. His commentary thrust him into high regard with the Iranian public, especially as the 
anti-American rhetoric allowed the Shah to become labeled as an American puppet44. These 
comments also caught the attention of the Shah, who then identified him as a political threat and 
exiled him. Khomeini lived in exile for 15 years and was able to maintain support in Iran through 
recordings of his political speeches which were dispersed in Iran. In these recordings, he asserted 
that the religious elite, of which he was a part, ought to lead Iran as they would be a true 
representation of the culture and values of the Iranian people. Labeling the Shah as a “stooge of 
the West,” he claimed that the Shah had no right to lead the country and was selling Iran to the 
corrupt Americans45. This proclamation was defended by two instances of the Shah’s poor 
leadership, the White Revolution and the prohibition of demonstrations commemorating the 
martyrdom of Iman Husayn. Reiterating the juxtaposition of the White Revolution with Islamic 
law, Khomeini asserted that these policies demonstrated the Shah’s willingness to sacrifice his 
country to appease the western states. Similarly, the attempts to limit religious demonstrations in 
reflected poorly on the Shah, as it was argued by Khomeini to be interpreted as a rejection of 
Islam and Muslim culture in Iran. When demonstrations to honor Husayn, the grandson of the 
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Islamic prophet Muhammad, began, disregarding the martial law, there were massive riots within 
Iran.46 SAVAK was called in to quell the violence and many were killed, injured and arrested. 
The Shah’s attempt to halt this outcry instead demonstrated the supremacy of religion within 
Iran, even over the power of the Shah47. While Khomeini was exiled to Iraq for his political 
actions, he incited larger opposition within Iran and continued to do so, even from abroad.  
 The 1970s proved difficult for Iran, especially economically. While oil allowed 
prosperity for some, many within the country were largely untouched by this wealth, living in 
poverty. Jahangir Amuzegar, Iranian economist and Minister of Commerce and Finance of Iran 
in 1962, reflected upon the overarching economic improvements in Iran under the Shah, as well 
as the continued income gaps. Amuzegar wrote, “Urban-rural income gaps (and income 
inequalities within each sector) did not narrow” 48. While absolute poverty did decrease, the gaps 
between groups did not shrink, causing great frustration and calls for action. The gap in 
economic status of Iranian citizens created pent up frustrations with the political elite who 
encouraged this structure49. Much of this discontent was tied to the United States. Iranian citizens 
drew upon the events of 1953 when reflecting on the United States’ influence on Iran. 
Additionally, they viewed the United States with distrust because American leadership turned a 
blind eye to the Shah’s human rights violations and enabled him to prioritize the military over his 
people. The turmoil of the 1970s was also capitalized upon by Ayatollah Khomeini. Dispersing 
cassette tapes of his voice recordings on the streets of Iranian cities, he was able to spread his 
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religious message and plant the seed of revolution50. Often calling the United States the “Great 
Satan” using the Iranian belief in Satan as a great tempter, in this case of materialism and 
immorality, Khomeini’s rhetoric was quite captivating51. In 1978, protests began in earnest as the 
Shah’s new economic policies caused a recession. Students, merchants, and elites took to the 
streets in urban areas, reflecting their lack of faith in the current leadership and their desire for 
change. One of the most pivotal moments in these political protests was the military’s attempt to 
break up a protest in Qom on January 9, 1978. As they opened fire into the protesters, many died, 
spurring further outcry. Most significantly, as those who died were put to rest, funeral 
processions typical of Muslim tradition began in Qom. People poured into the streets in 
mourning and it appeared as both a religious and political scene. This dynamic was crucial to the 
presentation of the revolution as an Islamic driven force52. 
 As the end of 1978 neared, protests began to increase in passion and participation. On 
September 8th, thousands of Iranian citizens poured into the streets in protest, ignoring the 
government’s ban on such political gatherings. The military was called in to stop it and began to 
use violence against the protesters. Hundreds died and their deaths signified the turning of the 
tides towards anti-Shah groups within Iran, the day later called “Black Friday” 53. In the 
beginning of December, as citizens were celebrating the Islamic holiday Moharram, mass 
protests began again and became more political in tone as the military joined the ranks of the 
protesters54. Many individuals witnessing the revolution of Iran from within the state were not 
pleased with the radical situation unfolding before them. Desmond Harney, a British diplomat 
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and banker who had lived in Iran for more than a decade, reflected on the concerning aspects of 
the revolution in his eyewitness account, The Priest in the King. In the final days of the Shah’s 
tenure, Harney explained his fears regarding this change in Iranian government.  
One asks if the regime deserves to succeed after all this? One feels it does not: and 
certainly if one was in a democracy the government would be out on its ear at the next 
election. But here is the awful problem posed by autocracy: the alternative is almost 
always worse, if only because of the repressed bitterness and frustration. So one clings to 
what has, hoping it will change (which it won’t and probably can’t) until it is finally 
swept away in some appalling revolution55. 
 
Harney’s fears came to fruition in the final days of 1978. After numerous attempts to appease the 
demands of the groups demanding change, the Shah recognized that he would not be able to 
continue to lead the state of Iran. He left on vacation January 16, 1979 and never returned56. 
Many Iranians differed from Harney, interpreting the Shah’s departure as the conclusion of a 
corrupt and immoral chapter in Iranian history, with Ayatollah Khomeini ready to return the 
citizenry to its Islamic roots. Less than a month later, Khomeini returned to Iran, celebrated by 
Iranians, while international audiences saw him as “a medieval theocrat, irrationality 
personified” 57. While the swift change of power allowed Iranians confidence in their ability to 
demand, future decisions regarding the new governmental structure would not be as simple.  
 In an effort to begin establishing their restructured government, Bazaragan was named as 
the Prime Minister of Iran. As he had before, he began to advocate for moderate changes in the 
government to comply with Islam. He was able to quell the protests and sought to unite 
individuals under the new Iranian state, hoping to build a secular government which was guided 
by Islamic tradition58. At the same time, Khomeini began to formulate his own councils in the 
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hopes of shifting Iran into an Islamic Republic. Attempting to mobilize support for his political 
faction, suppress anti-revolutionary opinions, and open preliminary investigations about Iran’s 
compliance with religious laws, Khomeini laid the foundation for his later take over59.  
 In March of 1979, it was decided that Iran would be an Islamic Republic rather than a 
monarchy60. While this was rather uncontroversial, in June, the government began to shift more 
dramatically. Prime Minister Bazargan proposed a constitution for the new Islamic state without 
judicial and administrative powers allotted to the religious establishment. This proposal was 
quickly refuted, as a group of experts was called in to reconstruct the draft. The revised 
constitution required all of Iran’s laws and regulations to be based on Islamic law and standards. 
This group also created the position of Supreme Islamic Jurist who would be the new religious 
and political leader of the Iranian Islamic State61. Quickly shifting from an Islam guided and 
more secular government to an Islamic state, Iran became almost synonymous with Khomeini 
and his radical perspective. From the viewpoint of the United States, this revolution and the swift 
shift to a new era of U.S. Iran relations was gravely concerning. Islam was seen as “an 
unacceptably expanding onslaught against Western civilization and, paradoxically, a welcome 
confirmation of how Islamic politics were medieval, sectarian, and evil” 62. As such, Iran’s 
abrupt change was seen as more than just a political issue, but a moral concern as well, placing it 
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1.3 US During the 1970s 
The 1970s were marked by economic difficulties in the US. The surprising combination 
of inflation and unemployment, created “stagflation,” or a stagnant economy with ballooning 
prices63. The creation of OPEC, a conglomeration of oil producing countries which worked 
together to set higher prices for oil, fostered an oil crisis in 1973. This crisis hit the United States 
especially hard, with prices rising to new heights and fears of shortages causing cars to line up at 
stations for hours to fill up64. The Women’s Rights and Civil Rights Movements of the 1960s 
also began to take root in American daily life, as legislation began to normalize demands for 
racial and gender equality of the decade prior65. Additionally, the United States’ presidency was 
shown not to be above reproach, as President Nixon publicly fell from grace in 1974 after 
ordering individuals to break into the Watergate Hotel to steal information from the opposing 
party regarding his reelection bid66. The Watergate scandal brought about new skepticism 
regarding the American political establishment and shattered many of the exceptionalism beliefs 
that had defined American politics for much of the 20th century67. American perceptions of their 
nation as the torchbearer of freedom and prosperity no longer seemed as guaranteed as it had in 
years past. The economic prosperity that had grown out of World War II reconstruction was no 
longer assured, with the 1970s dropping the median income growth of all families from $10,000 
from 1960 to 1970 to an increase of only $2,000 from 1970 to 198068.   
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 By the time James Earl Carter was running for president in 1976, Americans were 
frustrated. The trajectory of the decade and the political environment was not what these citizens 
had envisioned for the decade, and as such, many wanted to change up the political environment 
which had created these issues. As a one-term governor, Carter was perceived as an outsider. He 
was well-educated and passionate, but lacked association with previous corrupt politicians. Many 
Americans believed that Carter could change the dynamic of the 1970s with a fresh perspective. 
As he ran on an anti-Washington platform, asserting his dislike for political maneuvering and 
quid pro quo deal-making, he surprised many by gaining the Democratic ticket and later the 
presidency. Carter’s popularity quickly began to deteriorate, however, as he struggled to work 
with Congress to pass the legislation he proposed. As the economy still struggled, Carter was 
seen as unable to handle the duties before him and politic the country out of distress. While in 
the first year of his presidency, he held moderate approval, with an average approval rating 
above 50%, his approval began to slip below the majority in 197869. Labeling oneself as an 
outsider and identifying Washington as the corrupt enemy may have been good for winning 
votes, but it proved to be a problem for Carter as soon as he earned the office. Much of the 
establishment in Washington D.C. did not want to work with Carter to achieve his platform as 
they did not appreciate his portrayal of them as corrupt and unconcerned with the desires of their 
constituents70.  
 On the eve of the hostage crisis, a little over a year before he would seek reelection, 
Carter was entering unprecedented territory. His approval ratings were plummeting further than 
any president in recent memory. In early October 1979, one month before the hostage crisis, he 
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only had 29% approval71. With such a short amount of time until the 1980 election, his poor 
approval ratings were of great concern. The only two presidents to have lower approval ratings in 
the last 30 years were President Truman at 22% in the midst of the Korean War after firing 
General MacArthur and President Nixon at 24% in the days before his resignation72. President 
Carter’s attempts to lead the country were poorly received by the large majority. His efforts to 
stop American dependence on foreign oil by allowing the national government to allocate 
interstate natural gas through the Emergency Natural Gas Act caused backlash, with memories of 
the oil crisis of 1973 encouraging a negative view of these efforts. While the proposed package 
was passed by Congress, endorsing its political merits, Carter’s popularity was not impacted by 
its passage73. Similarly, when he asked the Federal Reserve to raise the interest rate to limit the 
rampant inflation, his allegiance to the Democratic platform was called into question74. Most 
importantly, the American people saw President Carter as a weak and unconfident leader. His 
Secretary of State informed him of the why Americans viewed him as an inadequate leader, 
specifically his perceived lack of concern for American citizens’ problems and a group of cronies 
leading his office. This information led him towards resurrecting his presidency in July 197975. 
Pledging major reform and acknowledging the serious problems of the country in regards to 
energy and national confidence, he gave arguably the most famous speech of his presidency.  
It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of 
our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our 
own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation… Our people are losing that 
faith, not only in government itself but in the ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate 
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rulers and shapers of our democracy. As a people we know our past and we are proud of 
it. Our progress has been part of the living history of America, even the world. We 
always believed that we were part of a great movement of humanity itself called 
democracy, involved in the search for freedom, and that belief has always strengthened 
us in our purpose. But just as we are losing our confidence in the future, we are also 
beginning to close the door on our past76. 
 
While his approval grew in the immediate aftermath of the speech, rising from 28% to a high of 
33% in August 1979, Carter squandered this rise in approval when he applied this crisis of 
confidence speech to his own office77. In the days following this speech, he asked each of his 
cabinet members for a letter of resignation and reflected upon the status of his leadership. He 
accepted 5 cabinet resignations in an attempt to shake up his presidency and increase his chances 
for reelection the coming year78. This was decision seen by the American public as a waste of 
time in the face of the problems of the United States, his approval ratings slipping to the same 
moderate approval as before the speech. President Carter again mis-stepped, most viewing these 
last minute decisions as another representation of his poor leadership and decision-making79.  
Relations with Iran also began to adjust during the Carter administration beginning in 
1976. Running on a platform of honesty and transparency, as well as holding our allies to 
American principles of freedom and democracy, Carter felt a greater duty to encourage the Shah 
towards the democratization of Iran.80 The continued reforms encouraged by the Carter 
administration catalyzed Iranian anger at the West for its interference and unawareness of 
Islamic beliefs which were in opposition to these reforms. An eyewitness to the revolution in 
Iran later reflected upon the United States’ hand in the Shah’s unraveling, writing,  “Carter had 
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unwittingly precipitated this, but now is unhappy at having to live with the consequences. His 
beautiful, human-righteous alternative is failing to appear – and his benevolent autocrat has had 
to become a harsh autocrat” 81.  
 
 
1.4 Overview of Beginning of Hostage Crisis 
 
 At 10:00 am on November 4, 1979, protests within Tehran, Iran flared up for another day 
amidst the revolutionary atmosphere in the capital city. This urban setting had become a 
breeding ground for widespread outcry and demonstrations in the months before and after the 
dictatorial Shah’s removal. The United States embassy had become a common protesting 
location in Tehran, as young revolutionaries desired to express their distrust and hatred for the 
western imperialism they had experienced under American diplomacy. In fact, more than six 
months prior, the United States embassy was taken hostage and the military was called in to 
remove the protesters82. This fourth day of November began similarly to this previous hostage 
situation. Unfortunately, the removal of these student revolutionaries would take far longer.  
A group of roughly 400 Iranian students, which referred to itself as “The Muslim 
Students Following the Imam’s Line,” overtook the American embassy in Tehran, Iran, taking 66 
individuals hostage83. These students were dedicated supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini and 
desired to aid in the creation of an Islamic Republic in Iran. This group hoped that a strong anti-
western and anti-American act would bolster support for Khomeini and discredit the current 
nationalist government. These students who overtook the embassy theorized the reactions from 
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Bazargan and Khomeini would vary significantly, causing a shift in support towards the 
ayatollah. They assumed the prime minister would attempt to quell the anger and radical anti-
western movements that were likely to grow out of the hostage situation, whereas Khomeini 
would endorse their act as an attempt by the students to take control of their own country84. The 
predictions were correct, although they did not anticipate the length of the hostage situation. This 
group only expected to remain in the embassy for a few days, assuming they would release the 
hostages after Bazargan was removed from power85. As news of the hostage situation swept 
across Iran and the globe, the anti-American sentiments were even more radical than the students 
anticipated. Feeling that this shift could create more change in Iran, these students prolonged 
their stay in the embassy. The act against the American embassy and broader American foreign 
diplomacy served to solidify Iran and rally support around Khomeini, creating a united Iranian 
state for the first time since the revolution. While in the days after the Revolution, many groups 
still sought to gain power, believing that the revolution was far from over, the anti-American 
aspect of the crisis gave credence to Khomeini and his followers, quelling opposition86. This 
simple plan to establish a united Iranian Islamic State, free from domestic and foreign 
interference, became an international crisis, one which lasted 444 days and catastrophically 
impacted Iran – American relations for decades to come87.  
 In the days leading up to the takeover, these students meticulously created a plan for the 
seizure of the embassy and discussed who would take part in the day’s events88. They hoped 
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their actions would throw out the nationalist government which had been established in Iran after 
the Shah’s departure. The removal of this preliminary government was not the only objective, as 
the students aimed to offer support to an Islamic state led by Khomeini. While there were many 
leftist groups which could have helped with the takeover, as they too held anti-American 
sentiments, this student group refused to let any of these groups participate because they were 
not in favor of an Islamic government89. Fearing their action would be accredited to the leftist 
groups within Iran which were vying for power, the hostage takers monitored the list of hostage 
takers, even taking attendance at the gate of the embassy to ensure only their own people were 
present90. 
The group of hostage takers reached out to Khomeini in the days leading up to the 
takeover, hoping to make him aware of their plan of action so that he could use it to his 
advantage politically, capitalizing on the anti-American sentiment which was likely to arise. 
Khomeini’s rhetoric had been blatantly anti-American and anti-western as efforts grew to throw 
out the Shah, however, after Reza Shah was removed and Khomeini established his own power 
within Iran, this vocalization by the Imam quieted. These students hoped to enlighten Khomeini 
regarding their plans in the hopes that he would use this act to reassert his anti-western rhetoric, 
uniting Iran against a common enemy91. While they did not speak with him directly, they did 
speak with a colleague, Ayatollah Mousavi Khoeiniha, who told them that although Khomeini 
would likely agree in principle, he might have difficulty publicly endorsing the act92. These 
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individuals were not discouraged by this conversation, as they continued forward with their plan, 
eventually gaining Khomeini’s endorsement for their anti-western action two days after the fact.  
Mohammad Tabaar, who studies international security and Middle East politics as an 
associate professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, argues in “Causes of 
the US Hostage Crisis in Iran: The Untold Account of the Communist Threat,” that the efforts of 
these students were not solely aimed to halt American interference in Iranian affairs. There was 
growing support for the Tudeh Party within Iran, as well as other leftist groups, which were 
supported by the fledgling Soviet state. This student group wanted the Iranian leadership to 
remain in the hands of the conservative religious elite and prevent power from changing hands to 
the leftist groups. These competing groups asserted that those in favor of an Islamic republic 
were not truly for Iran because they were not as against western imperialism and America as they 
believed themselves to be. As the sentiments within Iran were radically anti-American and anti-
western, this label was difficult to remove and a very serious accusation. Tabaar claims that the 
“Muslim Students Following the Imam’s Line” decided to overtake the embassy in part to 
demonstrate they were most anti-American group and neutralize their opposition93.  
 Upon gaining entry to the embassy, these students rapidly filed into the compound, 
clearing the floors of the building and securing the hostages. The American Embassy’s protocols 
were enacted as soon as the students entered the property. The State Department of the United 
States had established stringent protocols in the case of a takeover as the atmosphere in Iran 
began to shift during the revolution. During the revolution, the staff had been limited 
significantly in case of violence, from an original staff of 1100 to less than 7594. There was great 
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concern within the State Department that the US Embassy could be seized and its classified 
documents released to the Iranian public. Thus, protocols were put in place that in the case of a 
takeover, two employees would go into the file room and begin to shred and burn all documents 
kept in the embassy. The day of the November takeover, two embassy employees followed this 
protocol and began shredding and burning these documents. While they were able to destroy a 
portion of the documents, the process took far longer than anticipated. The Iranian students 
seized the rest of the undestroyed documents when these employees were discovered. After 
piecing back together some of the shredded paper and discovering some documents in a safe to 
which the embassy employees did not have access, the students released these documents95. 
Entitling them as “Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den,” these releases publicized the 
reality of American action within Iran. One such document showed that the State Department 
knew of the 1953 coup before it took place, officially implicating the United States. With the 
suspicions of Iranians confirmed, these releases further broke down trust between the United 
States and Iranian governments, quashing hope for negotiations that would return the hostages96.  
 After the students had achieved control of the embassy, they waited to see the reaction 
from both the current government under Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and the rising popular 
support for an Islamic republic led by Ayatollah Khomeini. As the nationalist government, 
established in the wake of the Shah’s departure from Iran, was still under pressure from 
revolutionary Iran, many saw this leadership as unstable and likely to fall. Additionally, as 
Bazargan had sought to work with the Shah in an exchange of power prior to the revolution, 
groups against this nationalist government saw the Prime Minister and his appointed leadership 
 
95 Farber, Taken Hostage, 131-133. 
96 David Banks, “The Diplomatic Presentation of The State in International Crises: Diplomatic Collaboration during 
the US-Iran Hostage Crisis” International Studies Quarterly 63, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 1172. 
 34 
as western puppets who did not serve Iranian interests97. Bazargan and his underlings were 
tainted by the negative connotation of being associated with the Shah, even if they were a part of 
his opposition. This interpretation was validated during the early part of the hostage crisis, as the 
Iranian government encouraged the students to leave the embassy98. As the hostage situation was 
widely supported within the state, this stance in opposition to it did not bode well for Bazargan. 
Related issues between the Prime Minister and public sentiment, including the debate regarding 
the prominence of Islam within the revolutionary government, demonstrated that the current 
leadership would not last much longer. Bazargan’s more moderate stances about Iran’s new 
governmental body were now seen as weak and compromising, lacking the more impassioned 
political rhetoric of Khomeini. 
 On December 2nd and 3rd, less than a month after the hostage crisis began, a new 
constitution was put to referendum and the nationalist government fell, making the way for a 
new Iranian government under Khomeini99. Unlike the nationalist government, Khomeini offered 
immediate support to the hostage takers, demonstrating his anti-western and anti-American 
commitments within Iran. He interpreted the actions committed by the Iranian students as a 
refusal of Iran to remain under the control of the United States100. These students represented the 
grassroot movement of Iranians fighting to assert control over their own country and its future.  
 David Houghton, in “Explaining the Origins of the Iran Hostage Crisis: A Cognitive 
Perspective,” highlights the fears which encouraged these students to take radical action to assert 
Iran’s independence from western power. Expounding upon the schema theory of psychology, 
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Houghton demonstrates that the mindset of these captors was set to Iran in 1953. As the events of 
1953 had been seared into the minds of generations of Iranians, with their one attempt at a 
representative government destroyed by the Kermit Roosevelt’s actions, these students were 
fearful that the Americans would again halt their quest for political freedom. The decisions they 
made were due in part to their belief that a scenario like the coup, which had placed the Shah into 
power, was likely to occur in the aftermath of the revolution. He argues that their framework of 
reference and the uncanny parallels between the Shah’s departure in the days before the coup and 
his departure in 1979 in surrender to the revolution resulted in an insuppressible fear of 
American intervention101. Thus, by taking the US Embassy hostage, they were asserting their 
control over the country they deemed their oppressor. The United States had to aid in a coup 
attempt in 1979. Carter had a far different approach to foreign diplomacy than that of 
Eisenhower. While Eisenhower was content to make adjustments to foreign regimes, which he 
deemed necessary in the midst of the Cold War, the Cold War was dying out by the time of the 
Iranian Revolution. While the USSR was still a threat, the United States, led by Jimmy Carter, 
felt more comfortable in allowing self-determination in countries across the globe. Earlier 
theories of containment and the domino theory had led the United States into Vietnam and most 
Americans could agree they wanted to avoid repeating that mistake102. Likewise, Carter and 
Eisenhower were very different leaders. Carter saw himself as a transparent and honest leader 
and was suffering in the polls, whereas Eisenhower had been the military general of the 
European theater in World War II and was seen as a competent leader for most of his presidency. 
Military strategy was a far more comfortable decision for Eisenhower due to his experience and 
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he did not have to be as concerned about public backlash. The reality of United States’ foreign 
policy decisions was not illuminated to Iranian citizens, as the United States still denied any 
participation in the coup of 1953. The radical anti-American sentiments within Iran, coupled 
with a concern that history was repeating itself offered an extreme fear in a second coup. As 
Mossadegh and Khomeini were seen as similar in their efforts to make great changes in the face 
of the unpopular Shah, many in Iran believed an American attack was imminent103
 
103 Houghton, “Explaining the Origins of the Iran Hostage Crisis, 270-272. 
 





 I aim to do a media analysis of the Iran Hostage Crisis, particularly portrayals of the 
United States and Iran, using three media outlets. These two newspapers, The New York Times 
and the Chicago Tribune, and one television network, CBS News, will allow me to look at media 
depictions of both the first and final days of the hostage crisis. The New York Times is one of the 
most recognizable newspapers in the United States. Its first issue released in 1851, this paper has 
a long-established reputation as a premier news source. As New York City has been the largest 
metropolis in the United States for more than 200 years, The New York Times has focused upon 
more national news topics, offering a broader view on world events. Throughout the 20th century 
and into the present, The New York Times has been categorized as a more left leaning newspaper 
according to Boston University104. As such, this newspaper source will be one of two news 
sources analyzed, the other being the more conservative leaning Chicago Tribune. The New York 
Times covered the Iranian Hostage Crisis from its first to last days and its techniques in reporting 
will be assessed for media coverage of the incident and portrayal of major characters and events 
throughout the crisis.  
The Chicago Tribune is one of the top ten most circulated newspapers in the country and 
is the only Midwestern newspaper to hold that status. In fact, Chicago is the largest Midwestern 
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city by far, allowing it to dominate representation of the breadbasket in news. The Chicago 
Tribune was established in 1847105. As a highly circulated metropolitan paper, the Chicago 
Tribune covers local, national, and international events, offering a more conservative lens to the 
events of the world106. The New York Times will offer a balancing perspective as a more left 
leaning news source. Throughout the 20th century, the Chicago Tribune was a well-established 
metropolitan news source. Therefore, journalists of this paper covered the Iran Hostage Crisis in 
great detail and the paper’s representation of this event will prove illuminating.  
CBS News was one of the three major national television networks in the 1970s107. These 
three networks held very similar viewership statistics, with all holding very high viewership as 
television was the news media of choice in the 1970s and 1980s. CBS News housed the “most 
trusted man in America,” Mr. Walter Cronkite, for much of the mid 20th century, including the 
period of the hostage crisis. Covering the most critical moments of history, from the 
assassination of President Kennedy to Apollo 11 landing on the moon, he captivated audiences 
with his representation of world news and his dedication to impartiality, “delivering the news 
straight and unvarnished” 108. Throughout the hostage crisis, he closed each broadcast by 
denoting the number of days that the hostages had been held captive in Tehran109. The Iran 
Hostage Crisis offered a unique opportunity for network television, including CBS News, as it 
was able to capture images of Iranian anti-Americanism abroad and American dedication to the 
hostages at home. Walter Cronkite’s career in journalism came to a close only six weeks after the 
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Iran Hostage Crisis concluded, making it the last American experience narrated by his impartial 
voice. Cronkite was “a witness to history who also helped shape perceptions of it” and thus, his 
commentary will be illuminating110.  
Throughout my analysis of the two cases studies of the Iran Hostage Crisis, the first days 
and final days of the crisis, I will be adopting the media analysis framework executed by Ralph 
E. Dowling in “Print Journalism as Political Communication: The Iran Hostage Crisis” 111. 
Dowling uses the work of Ernest Bormann, an American communication theorist, who analyzes 
news media. Bormann’s theory of symbolic convergence explains how shared narratives, like 
those created by the media, build and sustain group consciousness. He argues that the narratives 
put forth by people are innately biased, representing characters within them in a way which 
promulgates a particular characterization. Dowling takes this a step further, pointing out that 
news media has the ability to create even more powerful characterizations, as it has a large 
audience to which it can relay its biased narrative. This theory allows for greater insight into the 
reasons why certain portrayals are executed in the way they are by journalists. Exemplifying this, 
Dowling uses the method by which Bormann analyzes biased narratives, termed the fantasy-
theme method of rhetorical criticism, applying it to the Iranian Hostage Crisis. The fantasy-
theme method is predicated upon the belief that each group creates its own social reality in 
communication. There is not one all-encompassing reality which media outlets report upon. 
Instead, the media establishes the true social reality by the ways in which it reports upon the facts 
at hand. In order to identify the social reality which has been created by the media, one must 
analyze the themes present in the communications released. The qualities necessary to create a 
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narrative, those of character, setting, and action, each carry alongside them these themes. Such 
themes are vital to narrative, as they embody the values which define this shared reality created 
by the media112. As one uses this theory to identify and assess prevailing narratives, one is able 
to better understand the larger socially constructed reality and the values behind it. Upon 
identification of these fantasies and the themes within, one can better understand the values of 
the group which created them and those of the community they serve113. As I use this theory to 
delve into the critical moments of the hostage crisis, I will identify the themes which guide the 
media narrative between Iran and the United States. I aim to demonstrate that the actual events of 
the crisis are just one facet of the conflicting relationship between these two states, thereby 
helping inform historical analysis of events.  
As the Iran Hostage Crisis was covered extensively by American news outlets and yet 
was mostly taking place on the other side of the world, the media had extensive control of the 
immediate narrative and influenced the subsequent long term national interpretation of events. 
This crisis, in which 66 Americans were taken hostage, was the first significant encounter most 
Americans had with the state of Iran. As the power dynamic between Iran and the United States 
was skewed, the news media viewed Iran as an area of little importance and did not cover the 
country extensively. Thus, most average Americans knew very little of the history of Iran and 
their government’s controversial actions within it. This contrasted greatly with the average 
Iranian’s knowledge of the United States, as the American presence in Iran had changed the 
trajectory of their political system. While the United States government had maintained a stable 
relationship with Reza Shah since the coup of ’53 under Eisenhower, the low priority of this 
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alliance from the perspective of news media allowed Iran to receive little coverage and remain a 
mystery to most Americans. The embassy’s seizure and the media’s ability to capture images of 
blindfolded and bound American hostages and Iranian protesters crying “Death to America, ” 
caused the American public to become aware quickly. This sudden cognizance was due in large 
measure to the media’s coverage of these events. I argue that the media moderated the first 
substantive encounter between the average American and Iran. As such, I argue that the media 
played a pivotal role in the narrative which grew out of the hostage crisis. Thus, fantasy theme 
analysis will allow for a more critical and in-depth assessment of this narrative and personified 
characters, settings, and actions it established for American viewers.  
 
2.2 Case Study: First Days of Hostage Crisis (November 4-6, 1979) 
 
2.2.1. Background: The Hostage Crisis 
 
 On November 4, 1979 around 12:00 pm, the American Embassy in Tehran was overtaken 
by a group Iranian students who later identified themselves as “The Muslim Students Following 
the Imam’s Line” 114. Varying accounts reported between 300 and 500 students flooding the gate 
of the embassy. They faced little response from the 14 marines tasked with defending the 
embassy, as the military protection for the embassy had been instructed to refrain from firing 
upon the intruders115. The students overtook the compound, taking its 66 occupants hostage116. 
This was not the first time the embassy in Tehran had been taken hostage. Earlier that year, on 
February 14th, a group of protesters overtook the embassy and kept its occupants hostage for 
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three hours. During this earlier crisis, the Iranian government swiftly coordinated for the end of 
the hostage situation and tensions between the two countries calmed slightly117. Unfortunately, 
anti-American rhetoric had been amplified since the first embassy takeover. As such, the Iranian 
government’s willingness to come to the aid of the Americans had deteriorated. Additionally, 
while the nationalist leadership was technically in power, Khomeini had continued to gain 
support and at this point held more credence than Bazargan. Khomeini’s endorsement of this 
seizure would encourage the students to remain in the embassy. The drastic measure by the 
Iranian students forced numerous State Department officials to be awoken at 3:45am Eastern 
Standard Time, as this was the time of the crisis in the United States capital. Carter and his 
cabinet were kept apprised the situation as the State Department established a task force for the 
Crisis in Iran and began to work to return the hostages safely118.  
In the first days of the hostage crisis, President Carter was afforded a large boost in 
approval ratings, jumping 26 points and reaching 58% approval119. This was due in large part to 
the rally phenomenon, where a state’s leader is afforded more support from citizens as a result of 
the outpour of patriotic support during a national crisis120. This support of President Carter did 
not last. As the hostage crisis continued without resolution, with newscasters inundating the 
American people with the latest updates from Tehran and interviewing the hostages’ families, 
faith in President Carter’s ability to fix this crisis waned. By June 13, 1980, some seven months 
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since the hostage crisis began, Carter’s approval rating was again at 32%121. The American 
people were less optimistic in his ability to bring the hostages home.  
2.2.2. Media Analysis 
 Both The New York Times and the Chicago Tribune had been sent to print and therefore 
did not cover the hostage situation on November 4th, as the events unfolded in Tehran. Thus, the 
first reports by these papers on the seizure of the American embassy was Monday, November 
5th.122 Three articles appeared in The New York Times and six articles were published in the 
Chicago Tribune. In The New York Times, Reuters’ “Tehran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and 
Hold Hostages” was placed above the fold on the front page, Bernard Gwertzman’s 
“Government in Iran Vows Help in Siege” was located in a column on the first page as well, and 
“Iranians in Protest at Liberty Statue” by Robert D. McFadden was placed on page A11.123 
Similarly, “U.S. Embassy in Iran seized; staff is held,” ran across the front page of the Chicago 
Tribune, with three articles written by the Tribune Wire services outlining the events, John 
Maclean’s “It’s all your fault, Iran envoy says,” a personal story, “Chicago woman’s kin among 
hostages in Iran” by Lynn Emmerman, and an editorial entitled “Iran Ungoverned.” These 
articles in both papers addressed various aspects of the early moments of the hostage crisis, 
including details of the events themselves, descriptions of Iranian anti-American sentiment, 
governmental responses, and protests in the United States.  
 CBS News offered a small update regarding the hostage situation on Sunday November 
4th. Ed Bradley of CBS’s Sunday Night News detailed the events which had occurred in Tehran 
earlier that day with images of the student captors and interviews with Iranian leadership 
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interwoven throughout124. CBS News spent significantly less time on the event than it would in 
the coming days. This may have been because this same story had been broadcast across the 
country some months prior and had ended with little fuss. To close out the segment November 
4th, Diane Sawyer commented upon the parallel stories in Iran-US relations, saying, “this is the 
second time in a year the Iranians have taken over the US embassy in Tehran, which is forcing 
State Department officials to wonder even if this incident is peacefully resolved, what about the 
next125 ?” Reiterating the connection between these two events in Iran, viewers were encouraged 
to attribute the quick resolution of the previous incident with that of the present. 
 The first theme which must be assessed within fantasy theme analysis is that of the 
characters in the event being studied. When using the theory put forth by Bormann, the 
narratives which are told in this case by the news media are stories. As with most all stories, they 
have main and supporting characters. These characters may be analyzed for their actions and the 
ways in which the narrator chooses to portray them. In the early days of the Iran Hostage Crisis, 
the two main characters were the United States and Iran. The United States’ characters, including 
Carter, Secretary of State Vance, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, State 
department officials, and the hostages, were largely inactive and at most reactive. As The New 
York Times described Carter and Vance getting updated on the events at the embassy from Camp 
David and a State Department task force being established, the United States was clearly reacting 
the actions of the Iranian students who overtook the embassy126. These characters were then 
tasked with preparations and anticipating the Iranians’ next move. In Gwertzman’s “Government 
in Iran Vows Help in Siege,” the journalist explains the United States issued a response of 
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encouragement to the Iranian government to end the situation swiftly. This statement released by 
the US government, asserting that American leadership was confident in Iran’s ability to end the 
crisis, was unusual127. The United States sought to encourage Iranian leadership under Bazargan 
and bolster its confidence to deal with the situation quickly, avoiding internal conflict with 
Khomeini. Typically, “When an incident of this kind takes place, the host government is usually 
held responsible for embassy security and a protest is made. But because the Carter 
Administration recognizes the fragile influence of the Bazargan Government, it chose to offer 
encouragement rather that berate it for the incident” 128. As The New York Times reflects, Carter 
is portrayed as an anticipatory leader, one who does not lead by force, but by forethought. The 
Chicago Tribune echoed many of the same character themes of the United States, with the 
exception of highlighting a family member of a hostage who lived locally. This article in 
particular personalized the events unfolding on the other side of the world, humanizing it in a 
way which was not present in The New York Times. A sister of a hostage, Sally Smith, pleaded, 
“Now, all I can think of is that I don’t want my brother to die.” This emotional moment captured 
the events in a way that allowed Americans to perceive the event as impacting the life of a fellow 
citizen and neighbor129. CBS reported on the hostage situation similarly as well, illustrating the 
United States as both the victim of illegitimate actions and the leader who seek to resolve the 
conflict. Contrasting comments about the marine guards at the embassy who were ordered to 
avoid violence and the blindfolded and handcuffed hostages who were “paraded in front of the 
embassy,” Americans are portrayed as a civilized and abused people in Iran. Hoping to secure 
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the hostages diplomatically, the United States is shown to be in the right against the alternative 
character of Iran.  
 The character of Iran is described as the anthesis of the United States character. However, 
the character of Iran is more complex, as there are groups in conflict, waring for control of the 
state. While this was also true in the United States, as 1980 was an election year, the groups 
waring for control were doing so within the confines of the structures put in place by the 
government. Alternatively, Iran is still dealing with the repercussions of its revolution. People 
had been silenced for generations and are just now able to put structures in place to formulate a 
running government. Khomeini held the support of the Iranian people, but many smaller political 
factions believed there was enough instability to lay siege to the newly formed Iranian state. The 
current leadership under Prime Minister Bazargan is described by The New York Times as 
disunified from the religious majority led by “spiritual leader and de facto head of state” 
Ayatollah Khomeini130. This lack of representation of the majority caused great disorder and 
conflict, including the Iranian Hostage Crisis.131 While Bazargan met with National Security 
Advisor Brzezinski in the days before the incident, demonstrating his willingness for some 
degree of relations with the United States, the students who seized the embassy demanded that 
Iran halt all relations with the United States132. Bazargan’s association with the United States 
signaled his disconnect from the growing anti-American movement in Iran. The seizure action 
was quickly endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini and further cemented the divide between these two 
political groups133. The Chicago Tribune’s editorial, “Iran Ungoverned,” referred to Iran’s post-
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revolutionary government as “helpless titleholders who call themselves the government” and the 
religious sect as “the reactionary cabal of religious extremists headed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini”134. With neither fit to lead and supported by the larger Iranian public, the depiction of 
the character of Iran was haphazard at best. The lack of a clear hierarchy of power within Iran, 
coupled with the average American’s lack of knowledge regarding the state of Iran and its 
tumultuous relationship with the United States allowed for a vague and illusive character of Iran. 
An application Edward Said’s theory orientalism – where western countries portray the peoples 
of the Middle East as a strange and elusive “other,” in order to solidify their own identity in 
opposition to this group – is applicable in the early hours of the crisis135.  This post-revolutionary 
“other” of Iran was seen as radical in action and religion, far from American daily life. 
Throughout The New York Times articles, the students who overtook the embassy, as well as 
those who protested in New York City, were referred to primarily as “Moslim students” 136. This 
label, identifying them with their religion, spelling the term incorrectly, demonstrates the lack of 
familiarity the journalists had with Middle Eastern culture. Titling them as such isolated them 
from the large majority of American citizens, removing them from the scope of commonality and 
labeling them as a distant “other” in comparison to the character of the United States. 
 The second theme to be studied in the fantasy-theme method of rhetorical criticism is that 
of setting. In the first days of the hostage crisis, the setting was primarily in Tehran, as this is 
where the immediate action was taking place. The embassy was taken over, the Iranians were 
protesting, demanding that the Shah be returned from the United States where he was receiving 
cancer treatment to stand trial, and the Iranian government was posturing a defense for the 
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students. As scenes of the captors burning flags and parading blindfolded hostages were narrated 
by CBS’s Ed Bradley, the locale of Iran became connotated as the alternative to the American 
way of life and its values. The radical images captured by the media isolated this incident as  
something that would never happen in the United States, but still endangered its citizens. The 
revolutionary spirit of Iran, as well as its continued widespread protests covered by the American 
media, established a setting theme that was far from the norm in the United States, evoking the 
orientalist “other” and solidifying Americans as members of the “normal” society. Portrayed as a 
locale of violence and a breeding ground of unrest, Iran was seen as unstable and not to be 
trusted by American media consumers. Images plastered across the back of the Chicago Tribune 
demonstrated the radical repercussions of the crisis of Iran (Figure 1). These protests also spread 
into the United States, yet these events juxtaposed greatly with the events in Tehran as they were 
far more peaceful and democratic. Thus, the setting of the United States was the shown as the 
opposite of Iran. Following protocol, notifying branches of government, and carrying on with the 
tasks at hand, the United States was illustrated as calm and collected in the midst of this national 
trial. Upon hearing news of the crisis, Carter remained at Camp David, keeping his schedule 
while being updated as the crisis continued137. Iranians were allowed to protest in front of the 
hospital in which the Shah of Iran was being treated, advocating for his return to Iran to stand 
trial138. Even when other Iranians chained themselves to the Statue of Liberty, demanding the 
extradition of the Shah to Iran, the monument was simply closed for the day and the protesters 
removed, illustrating American law and order and the state’s ease of control over its citizens139. 
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While the act of the seizure of the embassy may have demonstrated differences in cultural 
perspectives between Iran and the United States, the resolution of the other episode represented 




Figure 1 Chicago Tribune, November 6, 1979 
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Finally, action themes are the third to be analyzed using the fantasy-theme method of 
rhetorical criticism. On the first day, there were limited actions executed by the United States 
and Iran. The Iranian students overtook the embassy, taking 66 Americans hostage. As the group 
of students who committed this act was so large as to overwhelm the gate and easily take control 
of the embassy, this action was a mass protest, an act endorsed by many140. The anger of Iranians 
towards Americans was clearly a wide spread issue if this group of students was able to maintain 
the support of its citizens in the wake of such radical action. Future plans of the Iranian students 
were vague, as demands for the release of the Shah were unlikely to be fulfilled. The hostage 
takers were unsure of their future actions if these demands were not met, claiming they would 
respond to what their people wanted141. Thus, using Bormann’s fantasy theme analysis, as the 
state whose embassy was seized, the United States was the victim, humiliated, as it was not able 
to stave off the illegitimate actions of a less economically and democratically evolved country. 
Following this action of aggression, demonstrations of support for those who had overtaken the 
embassy were performed in both Iran and the United States. Images of Khomeini, support for the 
hostage takers’ demands, and even more radical action, such as hanging banners off of the crown 
of the Statue of Liberty, all showed Iranian support for the acts of the students142. The Statue of 
Liberty is an iconic monument of the United States, frequently highlighted as an artistic display 
of the state’s commitment to its principles of freedom and justice. It is also frequently used by 
protestors as a site upon which to express their frustration for the times the United States has 
fallen short of these values. By using the Statue of Liberty to demand to return the Shah to Iran, 
these protestors were both challenging the actuality of these American ideals, as well as 
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demonstrating their disregard for American culture. US citizens laying witness to the difficulties 
of their fellow citizens across the world were also able to see these conflicts and Iranian 
discontent on their own shores, making it far easier to isolate them as the enemy. 
 
2.3 Crisis as Status Quo: November 7, 1979 – January 18, 1981) 
2.3.1 Carter and Hostage Crisis 
  After the first days of the hostage crisis, American leadership realized this issue would 
not be solved swiftly. The United States hoped to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis, with the 
Carter administration, led by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, working to advance discussions with Iranian leadership. They opened 
negotiations with Khomeini after he was identified as the leader of Iran in early December 1979, 
as well as President Bani-Sadr, hoping they would be able to put an end to this international 
fiasco. The United States had good reason for optimism, as conversations held with Khomeini 
while he was in exile in Paris had assured the United States of the religious leader’s commitment 
to maintaining economic relations143. Mohammad Taabar argues Khomeini did not change his 
rhetoric and begin to denounce the United States until broad sentiment in Iran turned against any 
relationship with the United States as the political environment radicalized in the wake of the 
seizure. Both United States and Iranian leadership strove to keep negotiations under wraps in the 
hopes of achieving a mutually beneficial agreement. Domestically, the crisis was such a “hot 
topic” within both countries; any perceived appeasement of the other nation would have been 
detrimental to the success of negotiations144. However, by early April 1980, negotiations for the 
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release of the hostages had failed145. Khomeini backed away from discussions as popular support 
turned towards more fervent anti-western and Anti-American rhetoric. Khomeini had learned 
from his revolutionary predecessors that one had to follow public sentiment in order to maintain 
power within Iran. Bazargan failed to maintain public sentiment and was removed from office146. 
In the 1953 rise of the National Front, Mossadegh and his two predecessors struggled to maintain 
the support of the rapidly changing political sphere.147 If Khomeini wanted to maintain 
leadership, he would likely have to wait to end the stalemate with the United States. 
 Fearing that negotiations would fall through, Carter had prepared a second plan to ensure 
the safety of the hostages throughout the negotiations process in early 1980. For months the 
Delta Force, a special operations force of the United States Army, had been getting ready for a 
hostage rescue mission. As the crisis was well publicized within Iran, the United States 
government knew where the hostages were located within the compound. This knowledge made 
a rescue attempt feasible according to military assessments, but likely with Iranian and American 
casualties. The original 66 hostages had been limited to 52 after the women and African 
Americans were released by Khomeini because he asserted they “were not American spies” 148. 
Khomeini made this choice to highlight the lack of opportunities afforded to these groups within 
the United States and thus the hypocritical nature of the United States chastisement of Iran. The 
Carter Administration had weighed the danger and decided that it was worth the risk.149 Rose 
McDermott analyzes Carter’s rescue attempt decision in “Prospect Theory in International 
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Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission.” She applies the prospect theory, where people 
“tend to be risk-seeking in the domain of losses and risk-averse in the domain of gains” 150, to 
explain Carter’s decision-making after negotiations fell through in early April. Carter was more 
willing to take risks to ensure the safety of the hostages and demonstrate that the United States 
would not accept this behavior from Iran. As this was an election year, this too played a role. 
Carter wanted a swift ending to the crisis to demonstrate his competence in foreign affairs. While 
there were other options on the table, including doing nothing, implementing sanctions, mining 
the harbors outside of Iran, and implementing a military strike, the hostage rescue mission met 
the most risk President Carter was willing to take151. He did not want to enter war with Iran, 
writing in his memoir, Keeping Faith, “I wanted […] to prevent the spilling of blood on both 
sides, but it would be inevitable if the hostages were harmed. I was restrained from a preemptive 
military strike by the realization that the Iranian fanatics would almost certainly kill the hostage 
in response” 152. As Iran continued to make threats to harm the hostages, Carter believed that the 
United States had to act and could no longer “depend on diplomacy” 153.  In order to maintain the 
international reputation of the United States and maintain the safety of its citizens, they could not 
sit back and wait any longer.  
 Secretary of State Vance attempted to deter President Carter from this action, believing 
that the Iranians would not harm the American hostages and would return them when there was 
nothing more to gain politically. While Carter respected Vance and had formed a strong 
relationship with him in the first years of his presidency, Carter chose to go against this advice. 
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Carter attempted to change Vance’s mind, but to no avail154. Vance was not invited to the final 
meetings in regards to the rescue mission and submitted his resignation in the days after 
receiving the news155. President Carter felt that the United States needed to demonstrate its 
commitment to its people and American military superiority and as such, was in favor of a rescue 
attempt. He gave his endorsement of the rescue, saying “it was time for us to bring our hostages 
home; their safety and our national honor were at stake,” while speaking with his top advisors156. 
Brzezinski also encouraged him towards this decision, as he felt that the costs for remaining at 
the will of the Iranians was far too great157.  
In April of 1980, five months after the Iranian students seized the embassy, the plan was 
put into action. Operation Eagle Claw, the code name of the operation, began with eight 
American military helicopters moved to the final fueling station before the rescue attempt. The 
plan was stopped short however, as three of the helicopters were unable to continue the trek due 
to mechanical issues. Charles Beckwith, the man who led the mission, believed that the hostage 
rescue mission could not be completed with only five helicopters. After hearing this assessment, 
President Carter cancelled the rescue mission158. Just seconds later, a helicopter collided with a 
fueling aircraft, exploding and killing eight service men. As the bright light and noise from the 
explosion caught the attention of Iran, the Americans had to flee, leaving the wreckage and dead 
military members behind159. 
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 This failed mission then had to be addressed by President Carter. The White House put 
out a press release early in the morning on April 25, 1980, stating that a rescue attempt had failed 
earlier that day in Iran. Later that day, President Carter spoke on national television, detailing 
specific mechanical issues that prevented the success of the rescue attempt and the lives lost in 
the process. He took full responsibility for the decision to go forward with the mission and its 
resulting failure:  
I made the decision to set our long-developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue 
mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national 
interests, and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many 
nations as this crisis has continued. It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It 
was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue 
team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own160. 
 
While the recognition of his own fault was commendable, this most recent failure of the Carter 
administration to resolve this crisis discredited him in the eyes of Americans. A Harris Survey 
completed by ABC News in the wake of the failed hostage rescue attempt found that of the 793 
voters polled, 70% believed it was right to have tried the rescue attempt, but 56% gave Carter 
low markings on his handling of the rescue161. The discovery of an attempted hostage rescue 
mission also further deteriorated relations with Iran, resulting in the hostages being moved, 
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2.3.2 Election and Hostage Crisis 
Only a few months after the hostage crisis began, President Carter began to run for 
reelection. Ted Kennedy ran against Carter in attempt to oust him as the Democratic nominee. 
The black sheep of the Kennedy family, Ted Kennedy had tarnished his reputation in 1969 in the 
incident known as “Chappaquiddick.” He recklessly spun off the road on Chappaquiddick Island 
in Massachusetts, killing the 28-year-old passenger in his car, Mary Jo Kopechne. This incident 
caught national attention, permanently marring his reputation163. Ted Kennedy’s candidacy 
demonstrated the lack of support President Carter had even within his own party, as Kennedy, a 
political pariah, believed he had a chance to oust a sitting president. While President Carter 
proved victorious in the primary, the campaign against the Republican Party candidate Ronald 
Reagan would be far more difficult and strenuous.  
Reagan tapped into the American people’s distrust in national politics and their 
disappointment in the current presidency’s domestic and foreign policy164. He simultaneously 
rejected the current American political sphere and celebrated American values of freedom and 
liberty, challenging Carter’s leadership abilities and celebrating the history of American 
democracy and world leadership. As he refocused Americans on the foundational aspects of the 
United States and the opportunity it had to take back the banner of world superpower, Reagan 
captured the attention of many voters. While President Carter’s recent track record showed him 
struggling to handle a small dictatorial state, Reagan’s impassioned speeches and idealized view 
of the United States allowed him to gain widespread support165. Reagan capitalized on the Iran 
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Hostage Crisis as a representation of how far America had fallen. As he debated with Carter 
October 28, 1980, he reflected on the hostage crisis as an area to study to prevent future 
missteps, saying “What I do think should be done… — and we've endured this humiliation for 
just lacking 1 week of a year now — then, I think, it is time for us to have a complete 
investigation as to the diplomatic efforts that were made in the beginning, why they have been 
there so long” 166. The United States’ identity as leader of the free world was threatened by this 
“humiliation” in Reagan’s view, as it was unable to handle this crisis in a timely fashion. Closing 
out his bid for election the night of November 3, 1980, Reagan opened with concern for the 
hostages and hopes for their safe return, however, he also highlighted that the infatuation with 
this crisis would soon be over and new foreign and domestic objectives would take their place. 
The most important item voters needed to consider when choosing their next president was 
preserving the American nation and its ideals, the “city on a hill.” This image, derived from 
Protestant theology encouraging the spreading of the gospel, has also been used to encapsulate 
America as a beacon of democracy and liberty throughout the state’s 200 year history.  
At this very moment, some young American, coming up along 
the Virginia or Maryland shores of the Potomac is seeing for the first time the lights that 
glow on the great halls of our government and the monuments to the memory of our great 
men. Let us resolve tonight that young Americans will always see those Potomac lights; 
that they will always find there a city of hope in a country that is free. And let us resolve 
they will say of our day and our generation that we did keep faith with our God, that we 
did act worthy of ourselves; that we did protect and pass on lovingly that shining city on 
a hill167. 
 
This idealized vision for America’s future offered hope to Americans who were frustrated with 
the Carter Presidency’s lack of success economically and his inability to bring the 52 hostages 
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home. On election night, November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan won 489 votes in the electoral 
college, leaving Carter to win only five states in addition to Washington D.C.168. After many 
promises by both candidates to bring the hostages home and end the humiliating episode, both 
were able to make good on their promises January 20, 1981. Carter negotiated with Iran in the 
last hours of his presidency and the hostages were finally released just minutes after Reagan’s 
inauguration169. While both were relieved to finally close out this chapter of American crises, the 
late return of the hostages prevented the political victory to be awarded to Carter for his 
diplomacy. Carter moved out of the White House and President Reagan welcomed the hostages 
home later that week. 
 
2.4 Case Study: Hostages Returned (January 19-20, 1981) 
2.4.1 Background: Negotiations 
 In the first month of 1981, the United States faced much change. President Jimmy Carter 
had lost his reelection bid. Republican Ronald Reagan was to be inaugurated January 20th and 
with it, the American public ushered into a new era of conservative policies. For Reaganites, his 
election caused a cascading effect in American domestic and foreign policy, ending the Cold 
War and eventually improving the American economy which had struggled for much of the 
1970s170. Additionally, the Iran Hostage Crisis, which had consumed the attention of the 
American public and had been a nightly news special for over a year, was coming to an end. By 
mid-January, it became apparent that negotiations to bring the hostages home were coming to a 
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close, mostly due to President Carter’s desire to end the situation before the end of his tenure171. 
On January 19th, it was announced that a deal had been made between Iran and the United States 
through their intermediary Algeria172. President Carter phoned the hostages’ families to inform 
them of their loved ones’ imminent return and publicly asserted, “We have reached an agreement 
with Iran which will result, I believe, in the freedom of our American hostages” 173. This 
confidence was short-lived, however, as a hitch in communication regarding the agreement and 
its appendix allowed for the hostages to remain in Tehran for another day174.  
After the failed hostage rescue attempt, relations between the United States and Iran were 
maintained their strained nature. With another rescue attempt ruled unlikely to succeed, and Iran 
interested in removing itself from the international spotlight, both countries were forced to come 
to the negotiations table and work towards a mutually beneficial conclusion. The diplomatic 
course proved very difficult, as it took over eight months and the help of an intermediary, 
Algeria, to reach a final agreement which was acceptable to both parties175. In late January 1981, 
days before Reagan’s inauguration, the United States announced that an agreement had been 
reached and the deal would be signed shortly176. Joseph B. Treaster of The New York Times 
captured the mentality of the hostages’ loved ones, quoting Mrs. Morefield who said, “It’s vitally 
important to my own well-being that when this is over I can say I got through it without falling 
apart. It’s my own way of fighting” 177. The deal around which American excitement followed 
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allowed for the frozen assets of Iranian citizens held in American banks to be moved back into 
Iran’s possession. These assets had been frozen in retribution for the seizure of the embassy and 
offered a way to draw Iran to the negotiation table. The Bank of England would accept the 
deposits made by the United States, swiftly turning the money over to the Iranians. The deal also 
opened negotiations regarding the late Shah’s assets between the United States and Iran, 
however, the hostages’ return was not contingent upon the success of these negotiations178. Once 
the monies were moved, the hostages would be loaded onto an Algerian plane and flown into 
Western Germany to receive medical treatment. The following week, they would return home to 
the United States. While this agreement did come to pass, miscommunications between the 
United States and Iran in regards to an appendix of the deal caused Iran to halt the deal for a 
period of hours179. This momentary halt prevented President Carter from meeting the hostages 
before attending Reagan’s inauguration.180 Expecting to report upon the hostages release, CBS 
News, The New York Times, and the Chicago Tribune all instead covered the negotiations’ flaw 
and the anticipation for the hostages’ arrival on January 20th. The New York Times ran “US and 
Iran Agree to Compromise on Funds After Dispute Delays Release of Hostages” and the 
Chicago Tribune stated “Iran charges hostage pact ‘subterfuge,’ delays deal.” These headlines 
echoed the narrative of the US media in regards to the hostage crisis and the end of Carter’s 
presidency. Even the conclusion to this foreign diplomatic disaster could not go smoothly.  
2.4.2 Media Analysis 
The characters of the end of the Iran Hostage Crisis were the same as those at the beginning of 
the crisis. United States’ characters consisted of the hostages, President Carter and his 
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administration, the hostages’ families, and the larger American public. Carter and the leadership 
surrounding him had faltered by this point, no longer seen as heroes but as those who had further 
embarrassed the American reputation. Alternatively, the hostages and their families were 
maintained as an object of heroism and bravery, a symbol of American endurance. Again, Iran 
and the United States’ characters are portrayed at odds by the media, Iran represented as the 
“other” to the familiar American character. As the media outlets of CBS News, The New York 
Times, and the Chicago Tribune are consumed largely by an American audience, these media 
consumers saw themselves as a part of the American character group, the lead character against 
the antagonistic Iran. In the final days, America is shown to be exhausted by the prolonged 
events of the hostage crisis and the negotiations to end the issue. Walter Cronkite highlighted the 
443rd day of the crisis, emphasizing the longevity of the issue and its continuation even in the 
face of the end of negotiations.181 The New York Times published stories highlighting Carter’s 
sleepless night as he worked tirelessly to conclude the hostage event, asserting “the day was a 
test of his physical endurance as well as his patience.” 182 This quote demonstrates the physical 
toll of the crisis upon Carter, also echoed in the American character. Similarly, the Chicago 
Tribune capitalized upon local exhaustion and frustration. “Hope and Frustration: Another Day 
of Waiting,” ran on the front page of this midwestern paper, alongside a photograph of Eleanor 
Kupke, a loved one of a hostage, ringing her hands with pursed lips (Figure 2)183. As this crisis 
drew to a close amidst fears of false hope and failed negotiations, the American people were 
reluctant to celebrate until the hostages were on American soil.  
 
181 Walter Cronkite, CBS News, January 19, 1981. 
182 Terence Smith, “Carter is Thwarted in Wish to Welcome 52 as President,” New York Times, January 20, 1981. 
183 “Hope, Frustration: Another Day of Waiting,” Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1981.  
 63  
Figure 2 Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1981 
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Similarly, the character of Iran was largely the same as early on in the hostage crisis, but 
with different individuals playing the roles of the Iranian state leadership. While Bazargan was 
no longer Prime Minister, President Bani-Sadr fulfilled the same role. He was seen as a moderate 
who faced great opposition from the more radical and religious majority184. Hostage Negotiator 
Behzah Nabavi was new to the narrative, “[favoring] the revolutionary garb of combat jackers 
and open-collar shirts, [and] has been closely identified with his longtime friend and fellow 
religious traditionalist, Prime Minister Ali Rajai, in opposition to the relatively liberal supporters 
of President Ban-Sadr” 185. The hostage takers, President Bani-Sadr, Prime Minister Ali Rajai, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Iranian public also made up the character of Iran at the conclusion 
of the hostage crisis. As these were the 443rd and 444th days of coverage of the events in Tehran, 
the media’s rhetoric regarding Iran was well-established, often describing Iran as irritated and 
politically scheming. While in the first case study, the character of Iran was quite vague and 
illusive, at the conclusion, there were far less explanations of Iran’s difficult behavior. When 
attempting to explain the reason for the hitch in negotiations, The New York Times described the 
head of the central bank of Iran, Alireza Nobari as “irritated because he felt the bank had not 
been sufficiently involved […] It was possible that Mr. Rajai, in an effort to resolve the political 
dispute might seek to oust Mr. Nobari” 186. These assertions, offered from unnamed sources, 
demonstrate a level of pettiness and disregard of Iran’s political institutions by the Iranians 
participating in the hostage negotiations. The stubborn, anti-American rhetoric of Iran had been 
normalized to some degree. The actions of the students who overtook the embassy and Khomeini 
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had been so focused upon by the media that they had become indicative of the nation. While not 
accepted by the American people, they had grown accustomed to the media’s portrayal of this 
“other” and no longer needed as much justification. The internal conflict which fractured the 
character of Iran into factions early on in the crisis was still present, with The New York Times 
claiming “political disputes within Iran” between the head of the central bank and Prime Minister 
Ali Rajai caused the delay187. Blaming this delay on another Iranian internal issue, the American 
people were easily able to attribute this fault to the Iranians and their poor internal leadership. 
The Iranian character also embodied themes of both superiority and victimhood, as the Iranian 
state postured itself against negotiations to end the crisis. Nabavi’s assertion that the delayed 
appendix given to Iran regarding negotiations amounted to an “underhanded maneuver for 
delaying the final solution of the problem” was quoted by all three sources188. Both the Chicago 
Tribune and The New York Times, as well as CBS, recognized the divisive language used by the 
hostage negotiator and its parallel with earlier anti-American rhetoric. This stance taken allowed 
for the character of Iran to be the victim of a powerful and potentially manipulative world power, 
while also posturing itself to appear morally superior. The Chicago Tribune denotes many 
officials believed “Nabavi may have raised the objection publicly to reinforce the notion that Iran 
was acting from a position of strength” 189. This posturing by the Iranians illustrated that this 
“other” had not changed since the beginning of the crisis and was still attempting to humiliate 
America. 
The setting themes for the conclusion of the Iran Hostage Crisis were quite different than 
those of November 1979. Both the United States and Iran were accustomed to the antagonistic 
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relationship they shared by 1981 and had accepted that they would never see the world in the 
same way. Their varied perspectives, as a dictatorial Islamic state, the first of its kind, and as 
western world power, permanently prevented them from making significant changes in their 
relationship. The acceptance of this reality allowed for the themes of anticipation for change and 
a mixture of hope and fear to break loose. In the United States, the media captured the first 
moments of hostages’ families hearing of their imminent release. CBS narrated the cries of 
celebration and quiet positivity of loved ones as they waited for the conclusion of the crisis190. 
Both The New York Times and the Chicago Tribune interviewed hostages’ families and friends, 
capturing the anticipation for their final arrival and safety. The city of Homer, Illinois was 
described by Tribune journalist Eileen Ogintz as impatiently waiting news on hostage and 
Homer native Paul Lewis’s departure from Tehran. Preparing by tying yellow ribbons around the 
trees lining Main Street, flying American flags from each shop, and hanging a banner which 
would celebrate his release, the town hoped the latest disagreement in the conflict would be 
short-lived. Even so, they continued to toll the church bell each day in honor of Mr. Lewis, just 
as they had since the crisis began191. This small Illinois village embodied American sentiment 
regarding the crisis, anticipatory hope and fear, while promising to never forget the last 444 days. 
The setting of Iran also had themes of change and conclusions in its description by American 
news media, however, there was far more speculation in those reports. The poor relationship 
between the United States and Iran disallowed reporters from getting a better understanding of 
Iranian preparations for the return of the hostages. Algerian airplanes were seen on the runaway 
of a Tehran airport and there was speculation that the hostages were waiting in the airport as 
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well, but those reports were later denied by Iranian leadership192. This vague anticipation in 
Tehran did not leave Iranians with the same hope or fear, but instead brought these themes to the 
American setting.  
Finally, the action theme of the last day of the hostage crisis was that of familiarity. The 
promises of the hostages’ return turned sour and threats by Iran were all too familiar for the 
American news consumer. Throughout the crisis, with each perceived victory came roadblocks. 
Why should the conclusion to this international disaster be any different? A White House official 
emphasized the almost humorous nature of this latest delay in negotiations, saying, “Nothing has 
been simple in this operation from the beginning 14 months ago… so why should this have gone 
smoothly193 ?” While this quote does little to assure Americans that the crisis is coming to an 
end, the latest actions are shown to fit into the narrative which has been written in the past year. 
Carter’s botched attempt to bring the hostages home as president and be there to greet them in 
West Germany fits alongside his previous struggles to deal with the Iranians and his fruitless 
attempts to come out from under their thumb. Lesley Stahl of CBS News said, “Jimmy Carter’s 
last full day as President of the United States found him once again at the mercy of the Iranians, 
who for reasons not fully understood here, have still not signed a final implementing document 
that would start funds flowing into an escrow account, which would in turn trigger the release of 
the hostages” 194. Describing the Iranians as illogical and vindictive echoed the previously 
established character of Iran. The actions which fit neatly into the pattern of the crisis fed into the 
quiet anticipation of the American audience, leaving them not so much hoping for good news as 
hoping for an end to this humiliation and the return of the hostages. This “long and harrowing 
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ordeal,” as it was referred to by Walter Cronkite, had deeply impacted the way Americans 
perceived themselves and their country195. Carter had proven unable to adequately care for the 
country, now it was Reagan’s turn to attempt to remedy the reputation of the United States.  
 
Conclusion: 
 Iran’s antagonistic behavior, seizing the American Embassy for 444 days, set the tone for 
the duration of the Iran Hostage Crisis and guided much of the narrative established by American 
news media. Amplifying the differences between American and Iranian cultures and political 
structures, The New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and CBS News established alternative 
characters of the nations of the United States and Iran. The international narrative in which these 
characters acted was consumed by the American public which were invested in the events 
unfolding in Tehran. While the news media formulated a basic narrative of good and bad guys, 
victims and aggressors, the reality was far more complex. Relations between the United States 
and Iran had been entangled for decades without much coverage by the American media. While 
historical analysis of the crisis tends to emphasize the role of the Iranian revolution and anti-
Americanism, the crisis is a reflection of the US-Iranian relations and cannot be considered 
without looking at the broad history between these two states.  Iran had suffered decades under 
the despotic and inhuman rule of Reza Shah, a ruler who the United States had put in place in the 
1953 coup and subsequently bolstered Iranian distaste for American interference. This continued 
to ferment quietly under the Shah’s suppression until revolution struck and radical action was 
deemed acceptable as the Shah’s power weakened. This distaste was finally acted upon by the 
Students Following the Imam’s Line when they seized the embassy, gaining the support of the 
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Iranian revolutionary leadership and public. The perspectives of Iranian and American citizens 
were vastly different in the period leading up to November 4, 1979 causing different 
interpretations of the crisis. The decade of the 1970s had been strenuous for both and each were 
focused on domestic affairs, seeing the other as an antagonist to their desires. The American 
media aided in this pursuit, focusing their citizen consumers upon American morality and Iranian 
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